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STANDARD_WORKSPACE
Technical_Record_v4.2
ID: 0xMLKEM

QUANTUM SHIELD MLKEM

Implementation of NIST-standard post-quantum key encapsulation within the Zeqron protocol.

Zeqron uses ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) for post-quantum key encapsulation — establishing shared secrets between peers and devices. ML-KEM is not a digital signature algorithm.

Transaction and identity signatures use ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204). Conservative cold-path signatures may use SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).

WHY ML-KEM?

Traditional key exchange (for example ECDH) is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on future large-scale quantum computers. ML-KEM is designed to resist classical and quantum cryptanalysis for key establishment.

KEY STRENGTHS

  1. ::POST-QUANTUM: NIST Level 5 parameter set (ML-KEM-1024).
  2. ::ROLE: Encapsulation / decapsulation only — never used as a signing primitive.
  3. ::STANDARD: Compliant with FIPS 203 (NIST).

IMPLEMENTATION IN ZEQRON

Nodes use ML-KEM during secure channel setup (for example peer handshakes and device sync). Signing remains ML-DSA / SLH-DSA.

rust_BUFFER
// Simplified key establishment (not a signature)
let (shared_secret, encapsulation) = ml_kem::encapsulate(&peer_public_key)?;
peer.send(encapsulation).await?;

If a peer attempts to authenticate with a non-approved signature profile, the connection is rejected under the active crypto suite policy.


Cryptographic Specification // Zeqron Security Lab — Draft

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